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“Sorry,” But I Didn’t Release It: How the
Court’s Analysis of the Fair Use Doctrine in
Chapman v. Maraj Protects Innovation and
Creativity in the Music Industry
Samantha Ross*
Abstract
The fair use doctrine is an important affirmative defense to
copyright infringement when a particular use does not interfere
with copyright law’s primary goal of promoting creativity for the
public good. Artists and songwriters frequently experiment with
copyrighted music without permission before seeking licensing
approval from the original rights holders to “sample” or
“replay” the work. In Chapman v. Maraj—a copyright
infringement suit brought by Tracy Chapman against Nicki
Minaj—the United States District Court for the Central District of
California held that experimenting with a copyrighted musical
composition for the purpose of creating a new work with an intent
to seek licensing approval constitutes fair use and thus does not
infringe the original copyright holder’s exclusive right to prepare
derivative works. This Note explores why the holding in Chapman
v. Maraj is vital for the protection of songwriting and the music
business as well as the continuation of innovation and creativity
in music, analyzing this importance in light of the established
goals of copyright law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of incorporating portions of existing copyrighted music
into the creation of new works is a fundamental part of modern
songwriting and producing, particularly in the hip hop genre.1 Actually,
“[m]usical borrowing is a pervasive aspect of musical creation in all genres
and all periods.”2 Today, in a world where anyone with a computer and
internet access can take pieces of existing music and combine it with their
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Business Law Review; Juris Doctor and Master of
Laws in Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Candidate, University of Miami School of
Law, 2022; Bachelor of Business Administration, Music Business, Belmont University,
2019. Special thanks to Professor Andres Sawicki for his support and guidance in putting
together this Note, as well as the entire Editorial Board of the University of Miami Business
Law Review for their helpful edits and feedback.
1
Sam Claflin, How to Get Away with Copyright Infringement: Music Sampling As Fair
Use, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 159, 160 (2020).
2
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From JC Bach to Hip-Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 547 (2006).
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own, experimenting with existing copyrighted music is more prevalent
than ever despite the significant development of copyright law over the
past century.3 Although current copyright law bars the unauthorized use of
copyrighted material in new works—through means such as sampling or
replaying—artists often experiment with preexisting copyrighted works
before ever seeking clearance from the copyright holder. In fact, if an artist
intends on sampling or replaying a preexisting song—a concept that will
be explained momentarily—they normally must first actually complete the
creation of the song before seeking permission from the copyright holders
in order to show the publisher and record company behind the ownership
of the original song how it will be used in the new work.4
Recording artist Onika Tanya Maraj, more popularly known as Nicki
Minaj (“Minaj”), did just that: experiment. Minaj was working on an
album and began playing around with portions of a song, “Sorry” by
Shelly Thunder, when she discovered that it was actually a cover of Tracy
Chapman’s (“Chapman”) song “Baby Can I Hold You.”5 Minaj
immediately sought a license from Chapman—the composition and sound
recording copyright holder of the song—but Chapman adamantly refused,
leading Minaj to subsequently remove the song from her upcoming
album.6 Still, Chapman maintained that Minaj’s use of her song
constituted infringement.7 Thus, in 2018, Chapman sued Minaj for
copyright infringement.8 On September 16, 2020, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California held that although
Minaj infringed Chapman’s copyright in taking lyrics and melody from
Thunder’s version, her experimentation with the song with the intention
of seeking a license constituted fair use.9
The decision in Chapman v. Maraj is unlike cases involving typical
copyright infringement. Although Minaj technically infringed Chapman’s
work, the holding instead turned on whether Minaj could be held liable for
sampling Chapman’s work without actually commercially releasing the
song. This Note will analyze the court’s holding in Chapman v. Maraj and
discuss its importance to creativity and innovation in the music industry.
Part II of this Note discusses the concept of sampling and replaying and
the way in which copyright law governs derivative works. Part III then
3

See Guilda Rostama, Remix Culture and Amateur Creativity: A Copyright Dilemma,
WIPO (June, 2015).
4
See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 251
(Simon & Schuster, 10th ed. 2019).
5
Chapman v. Maraj, No. 2:18-cv-09088, 5-6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020).
6
Id. at 6.
7
See id. at 1.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 12.
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addresses the fair use doctrine and the application of the doctrine in
Chapman v. Maraj. Part IV then identifies the implications of the holding
in Chapman, including the decision’s impact on the music licensing
process and the importance of the fair use doctrine in furthering creativity
and innovation in music.

II.

SAMPLING AND REPLAYING UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW

The development and progress of art and culture has, throughout
history, involved referencing past or existing expressions which are then
used to create new ones.10 All forms of artistic expression, from visual art
to architecture, have relied on the practice of borrowing from the past to
inspire something new.11 Yet, copyright law requires that a work must
have some level of originality in order for the author to be granted certain
exclusive rights over the work.12 This idea, however, “is constantly in
tension with the reality that virtually all creative persons work on the
shoulders of those who preceded them.”13 This tension is kept balanced by
a variety of factors, including the limited duration of copyright protection
and the dichotomy between idea and expression: although creators may
reference others’ ideas within copyrighted works, they typically may not
explicitly copy the expression of those ideas in the creation of new
copyrightable material.14
This dichotomy can be seen within the root of federal copyright
protection, found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution,
which gives Congress the power to “promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”15 The
generally accepted purpose of copyright law is to encourage and
incentivize individuals to create works for the benefit of society. 16
10

See Rostama, supra note 3.
See Emily Harper, Music Mashups: Testing the Limits of Copyright Law As Remix
Culture Takes Society By Storm, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 405 (2010) (citing Lawrence
Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy, 82-83 (2008)).
12
17 U.S.C. § 102.
13
Richard H. Chused, The Legal Culture of Appropriation Art: The Future of Copyright
in the Remix Age, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 163, 170 (2014).
14
17 U.S.C. § 102(b). This dichotomy has proven tumultuous over time in the
enforcement of copyright law, as the intangible distinction between ideas and expressions
of those ideas is often subjective. See generally Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker
v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REV. 604 (1998).
15
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16
See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv., Co. 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991).
11

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

243

Copyright owners, therefore, have a set of exclusive rights in their
copyrighted work and can prevent others from distributing, reproducing,
performing, or creating derivative works based on such copyrighted
work.17 These exclusive rights incentivize authors to produce creative
works for the advancement of the arts and, ultimately, the benefit of the
public through access and use of the works.18
When it comes to music, copyright protection is separated into the
musical composition and the sound recording, which are two separate
copyrights.19 A musical composition is a song’s melody and lyrics, while
a sound recording is the embodiment of the performance of a musical
composition—nowadays, this is usually the digital recording of the song.20
The copyright owner of a musical composition, as mentioned previously,
enjoys certain exclusive rights, including the right to create derivative
works,21 which is the right at issue in the court’s decision in Chapman v.
Maraj.22 If someone interferes with a copyright owner’s exclusive right
without permission, the copyright holder can sue for infringement.23 And
unless the defendant can successfully assert an affirmative defense, the
plaintiff will be entitled to a remedy.24
A “derivative work” is a work that is based upon a previously
copyrighted work.25 The category of derivative works includes sound
recordings as well as various other forms in which a copyrighted work is
transformed or adapted in some way.26 In the music industry, the practice
of building upon previously copyrighted work to create derivative works
is quite prevalent. Under the compulsory licensing regime in copyright
law, anyone can make their own version of a musical composition as long
as the composition has been previously recorded with the permission of
the composition copyright owner and a statutory royalty is paid to the
composition copyright owner for the use of the composition. 27 This
practice contributed to a musical culture that widely accepted the act of
using the music of others without permission.28 And sampling or
17

17 U.S.C. § 106(a).
Michael Allyn Pote, Mashed-Up In Between: The Delicate Balance of Artists’
Interests Lost Amidst the War on Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 649 (2010).
19
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
20
17 U.S.C. § 101.
21
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(a).
22
Chapman v. Maraj, No. 2:18-cv-09088, 21-29 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020).
23
Harper, supra note 11, at 413 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)).
24
Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1994)).
25
17 U.S.C. § 101.
26
Id.
27
See 17 U.S.C. § 115.
28
Chused, supra note 13, at 179.
18
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replaying—both involving the practice of taking pieces of a copyrighted
work in the creation of a new one—have also been integral to the
development of music during the past century.29
The legal right to use a composition without permission, upon the
payment of a royalty, is called a compulsory mechanical license.30 This
license, however, applies only to pure covers of a musical composition; if
the use changes the “fundamental character” of the composition, the use
then requires permission from the composition copyright owner.31 A
copyright holder can, therefore, deny anyone permission to create a
derivative work that changes the fundamental character of the song for any
reason. Although Chapman accordingly cannot prevent Minaj from
creating a pure cover of her song, Chapman may deny—and did numerous
times—Minaj’s use of the song because Minaj’s use of the composition
altered the character of the song.
Minaj’s use of Chapman’s song falls into the realm of sampling or
“replaying,” which either involves the use of the original sound recording
or a duplication of a part of a song in a studio, respectively, both of which
require express permission from the original copyright owner.32 These
practices differ from a cover, which involves a new recording of the
composition and generally only requires a compulsory license (but not in
all circumstances).33 Minaj was experimenting with Shelly Thunder’s
song—a cover of Chapman’s work—which means that Minaj’s use is
considered a “replay” of Chapman’s composition, even if Minaj is directly
sampling a cover track. Although sampling requires permission from both
the musical composition copyright owner and the sound recording
copyright owner, “replaying” only requires permission from the musical
composition copyright owner.34 Here, Chapman owns both the musical
composition copyright and the sound recording copyright to the song in
question. Her denial of a license to Minaj, however, is solely based in her
exclusive rights as a musical composition copyright holder because Minaj
was not attempting to directly sample Chapman’s work, but rather was
experimenting with a cover of it, thus only using the lyrics and melody of
Chapman’s composition in her new work. That being said, this Note
discusses the implications of the court’s holding for both replaying and
sampling.
29

Lauren Fontein Brandes, From Mozart to Hip-Hop: The Impact of Bridgeport v.
Dimension Films on Musical Creativity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 93, 94 (2007) (internal
citation omitted)).
30
17 U.S.C. § 115.
31
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
32
See Passman, supra note 4, at 215-217.
33
See id. at 251.
34
Id.
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Since the Southern District of New York’s holding in a 1991 case
involving a rap sample, courts have made it clear that under copyright law,
the practice of sampling without permission constitutes copyright
infringement.35 That decision severely reduced the amount of sampling at
the time, which had a significant impact on rap music—a genre built on
sampling.36 Fourteen years later, the Sixth Circuit confirmed that sampling
copyrighted work requires a license and asserted that doing so does not
stifle creativity.37 In 2016, however, the Ninth Circuit published a contrary
holding involving Madonna’s song “Vogue” in ruling that some samples
are so trivial that they are de minimis and therefore non-infringing.38
Despite the general licensing requirement for sampling sound recordings
and the uncertainty surrounding whether a specific sample constitutes
infringement, sampling remains quite popular in music today. And, “to
avoid liability for copyright infringement, popular artists obtain licenses
for the works they sample”—at least most of the time.39
The process of obtaining a license to sample or replay a copyrighted
sound recording or musical composition in the creation of a new work is a
matter of private negotiation between a potential licensee and licensor.40
When directly sampling the original sound recording in a new
composition, a license is required not only from the sound recording
copyright owner—typically the artist and their record label—but also from
the musical composition copyright owner—usually the songwriter and
their publisher.41 As previously mentioned, the practice of replaying only
requires the original musical composition copyright holder’s permission.42
In the professional music industry, artists commonly sample or replay
songs in the studio and, before commercially releasing the new work, wait

35

See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a rap artist’s partial inclusion of a piece of copyrighted
material in a rap recording constituted copyright infringement).
36
Brandes, supra note 29, at 95.
37
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a two-second sample of a George Clinton song looped through the N.W.A.
track “100 Miles and Runnin’” was a violation of Clinton’s copyright).
38
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that Madonna’s
sample in Vogue was de minimis and therefore not enough to constitute copyright
infringement).
39
Pote, supra note 18, at 684 (internal citations omitted).
40
See Harper, supra note 11, at 437 (citing David M. Morrison, Bridgeport Redux:
Digital Sampling and Audience Recording, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
75, 111 (2008)).
41
See Buck McKinney, Creating the Soundtrack of Our Lives: A Practical Overview of
Music Licensing, 48 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1, 3 (2020).
42
See generally Passman, supra note 4, at 215-217.

246

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:239

for licensing permission from the copyright owner of the sampled or
replayed work.43
Although some believe that the permission requirement in sampling
or replaying undermines the goals of copyright law,44 Chapman v. Maraj
involves the distinct issue of whether an artist can be liable for pulling
from an existing copyrighted song before commercially releasing the
work.45 The question was not whether Chapman’s permission was
necessary for Minaj to release a new song based on Chapman’s song; the
answer there is undoubtedly yes, as Minaj’s work clearly infringed
Chapman’s copyright.46 Instead, the question is whether Chapman’s
permission was necessary for Minaj to experiment with Chapman’s
composition in the studio in light of the fact that Minaj intended to obtain
a license before releasing the work commercially.47 To answer this
question, the court considered Minaj’s asserted affirmative defense of fair
use.48

III.

THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE AND CHAPMAN V. MARAJ

Copyright law requires that a songwriter or artist obtain permission
from the copyright owner to use a copyrighted work.49 Someone cannot
simply sample or replay a song and release it without a license.50 Under
specific circumstances, however, an individual may use a copyrighted
work without infringing on the copyright owner’s exclusive rights if the
use is considered “fair.”51 The fair use doctrine is asserted as an affirmative
defense to copyright infringement actions,52 so the party claiming it carries
the burden of proof.53

43

See Jeffrey Omari, Mix and Mash: The Digital Sampling of Music Has Stretched the
Meaning of the Fair Use Defense, 33 L.A. LAW. 35, 40 (Sept. 2010).
44
See, e.g., Terry Hart, License to Remix, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 837, 837 (2016)
(citing Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1151, 1193 (2007)); see also Amy B. Cohen, When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative
Works of a Copyright Owner?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 623, 646 (1999).
45
See Chapman v. Maraj, No. 2:18-cv-09088 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020).
46
See id. at 5.
47
See id.
48
See id. at 9-11.
49
See 17 U.S.C. § 114.
50
See Am. Jur. 2d Copyright and Literary Property § 119.
51
17 U.S.C. § 107.
52
See id.
53
See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918 (2d Cir.
1994).

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

247

The doctrine is applied and analyzed by courts on a case-by-case
basis,54 allowing courts to interpret copyright law according to the specific
facts of each case in a way that balances the interests of copyright owners
and the general public.55 As a result of the “uncertainty of fact-specific
inquiries,”56 the fair use doctrine is often considered “the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright”57 in that previous situations
constituting fair use do not always help predict the outcome of future cases
involving fair use defenses.

A.

Development and Justification of the Fair Use Doctrine

The fair use doctrine,58 as observed by the Supreme Court in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster.”59 The doctrine is based upon the idea
that creating new works often involves referencing existing ones, and in
some circumstances, this sort of referential activity should be permitted,
as it furthers the purpose of copyright law.60 As a result, the fair use
doctrine is arguably the most important mechanism in balancing the
interests of copyright holders in the control and exploitation of their work
on the one hand, and the public’s interest in access to and use of work for

54

Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir.
1998).
55
See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 406 (2005).
56
Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, and Copycat Comic Books: The
Fourth Fair Use Factor in U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665, 679 (2004).
57
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
58
The idea of fair use can be traced back to English courts whose rationale was that new
authors who used previous authors’ works in good faith could create works that would then
benefit the public. See Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141 (1740). Fair use in the United States
was likely first explicitly introduced in Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh. Justice
Story analyzed the two extremes of referencing past work: essentially copying the entire
work versus copying for the purpose of review or criticism. Story believed that if a new
work fell somewhere in between these two extremes, courts must then evaluate the
defendant’s creative effort and whether the new work diminished the value of the original.
If a work was simply the result of a “facile use of scissors” rather than substantial
“intellectual labor,” Story stated that the use of existing work was not fair. Justice Story
believed several factors should be taken into consideration when determining the fair use
of copyrighted work in the creation of a new one, including “the value of the materials
taken, and the importance of it to the sale of the original work.” Congress eventually
codified similar factors in the Copyright Act of 1976. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,
344-48 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
59
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
60
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1108
(1990).
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the furtherance of the arts on the other.61 The fundamental goals of
copyright law require not only that “artists be incentivized to create works
of art,” but also that “future artists be able to use those works in order to
advance the arts.”62 Thus, copyright law must balance the interests of both
sides—something that the application of the fair use doctrine can help
accomplish.63

B.

Chapman v. Maraj

The bulk of intellectual discussion on fair use, replaying, and sampling
in the music industry over the past few decades involves whether sampled
music being sold without a license should constitute fair use.64 The use in
Chapman v. Maraj, however, involved a song that was never
commercially released.65 The analysis in Chapman turned on whether
experimenting with a copyrighted song without permission with the
intention to request a license before a commercial release constitutes fair
use of that copyrighted work.66
In October 2018, Tracy Chapman sued Nicki Minaj for copyright
infringement of Chapman’s musical composition, “Baby Can I Hold
You.”67 Minaj had been working on a project using a song by artist Shelly
Thunder entitled “Sorry.”68 She experimented with the song to see what
would come of it, with the intention of seeking a license if she decided to
release it.69 After Minaj’s representatives discovered that “Sorry” was, in
fact, a cover of a song by Tracy Chapman, Minaj began seeking
permission from Chapman to release the song on her upcoming album.70
Chapman denied all requests from Minaj for a license to release the
new song incorporating Chapman’s composition, even after multiple
attempts over the course of about two months and an attempt to get

See THE DEP’T OF COM. INTERNET POL’Y TASK FORCE, Copyright Policy, Creativity,
and Innovation in the Digital Economy, 21 (2013) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
62
Pote, supra note 18, at 692 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
63
See id.
64
See, e.g., Vera Golosker, The Transformative Tribute: How Mash-Up Music
Constitutes Fair Use of Copyrights, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 381, 381 (2012); See
also Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing . . . Oh My! How Hip Hop Music
is Scratching More Than the Surface of Copyright Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 843 (2011); see generally Pote, supra note 18.
65
Chapman v. Maraj, No. 2:18-cv-09088, 10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020).
66
See id. at 9-12.
67
Id. at 1.
68
Id. at 5.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 6.
61
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permission via Twitter.71 After these rejections, Minaj decided not to
commercially release the song and removed it from her 2018 album,
Queen.72 Chapman and Minaj agreed that Minaj never intended to exploit
the song without a license.73 However, even after Minaj was repeatedly
denied permission, Minaj had the song mastered by a recording engineer.74
Although Minaj did not release the song on her album, Chapman
maintained that Minaj was liable for creating a song that incorporated the
lyrics and melodies of her composition.75 Additionally, Chapman alleged
that Minaj willfully infringed her exclusive right of distribution by
“leaking” the song to a radio host who played it once on the radio.76 Minaj
sought summary judgment only on the issue of her alleged infringement,
arguing that the creation of the new song constituted fair use.77 The
distribution issue regarding the radio leak of the infringing song was
settled in January 2021, with a court ordering Minaj to pay Chapman
$450,000.78 It is unclear whether Chapman would have alleged copyright
infringement were it not for the radio leak, however, this factor is not
analyzed in this Note.
In September 2020, the court granted Minaj’s motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of alleged infringement for the creation of
a derivate work because liability was barred by the fair use doctrine,
stating that her “creation of the new work for the purpose of artistic
experimentation and to seek license approval from the copyright holder
thus did not infringe Chapman’s right to create derivative works.”79 The
court’s analysis of the factors in determining whether Minaj’s use
constituted fair use are discussed below.

C.

The Fair Use Factors

Under copyright law, “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . .
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”80 The statute
provides that a court must consider four main factors—though it may

71

Id.
Id.
73
Id. at 10.
74
Id. at 6.
75
Id. at 1.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Dylan Smith, Nicki Minaj Ordered to Pay $450,000 to Tracy Chapman in ‘Sorry’
Copyright Infringement Suit, D IGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.
digitalmusicnews.com/2021/01/08/nicki-minaj-tracy-chapman-payment/.
79
Chapman v. Maraj, No. 2:18-cv-09088, 11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020).
80
17 U.S.C. § 107.
72
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consider more—when determining whether an allegedly infringing use of
a copyrighted work constitutes fair use:
the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work;
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.81
The law does not attempt to direct the courts on how to weigh the four
factors; however, it does indicate that the statutory factors should not be
analyzed purely in isolation, but should be “weighed together, in light of
the purposes of copyright.”82 The court in Chapman v. Maraj analyzed and
weighed each of the fair use factors, concluding that the first, third, and
fourth factors favored a finding of fair use.83

i. The Purpose and Character of the Use
In analyzing the first factor, courts determine how the copyrighted
work is being used and for what purpose, emphasizing that uses which are
“transformative” are more likely to be fair.84 The purpose of this inquiry
is to determine whether the new work “supersede[s] the objects” of the
original work, thus taking the place of the original, “or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message.”85 Typically, the practice
of sampling involves taking actual parts of a recording and placing them
in a new work,86 in which case the use of the original copyrighted work
would likely not be transformed at all. In some cases, however, sampling
or replaying sound recordings can be transformative, particularly if the use
“combines genres, tempos, and styles of music . . . resulting in a whole
creatively distinct from just the sum of its popular parts.”87
Courts may find in favor of fair use, “[e]ven where a use is only mildly
transformative,” if the new work has a “substantial benefit to the public.”88
81

Id.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
83
Chapman, No. 2:18-cv-09088 at 10-11.
84
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-579.
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Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
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See John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the Sixth
Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 210 (2005).
87
Golosker, supra note 64, at 390.
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Pote, supra note 18, at 674-75 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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Sampling and replaying, however, are used primarily for entertainment
purposes, so any resulting public benefit is unlikely to weigh significantly
in favor of a finding of fair use.89 Although the transformative inquiry is
often utilized in courts’ analyses of the first fair use factor, a use “need not
be transformative” to constitute fair use, as the “concept of transformative
use is intended to be explanatory of the most common fair use purposes,
[though] it is not exhaustive of the doctrine.”90
Over time, courts have determined that the first factor requires an
analysis not just of the purpose of the use, but also whether the specific
use was necessary to achieve the asserted purpose.91 In doing so, the
inquiry focuses on the use instead of the user, “forc[ing] courts to properly
examine the actual nature of the use made, rather than the general nature
of the defendant’s work as a whole.”92 This particular portion of the first
factor’s analysis is central to the court’s findings in Chapman.
Lastly, courts are called to consider the commercial nature of the work
in analyzing the purpose and character of the use in question. 93
Commercial motivation typically weighs against a finding of fair use, but
the degree to which the person claiming fair use actually exploits their
work for commercial gain is also relevant to the analysis of the first fair
use factor.94 If the use of a work is merely incidentally commercial, a court
may find that its commerciality does not weigh against a finding of fair
use.95
In some cases, even the use of sampled music in a new work that is
not commercially released can be considered commercially motivated if
the new work’s artist stands to profit from other realms like touring or fan
donations.96 The Supreme Court has accordingly held that the question of
89

See id. at 675 (arguing that audio mashups offer very little public benefit to the public,
which likely does not contribute to a finding of fair use).
90
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 3:1 (2021) (citing Society of the Holy
Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Denver, Colorado, 2010 WL
4923907, at *6 (D. Mass. 2010).
91
See id. (citing Storm Impact v. Software of Month Club, 13 F. Supp 2d 782, 787 (N.D.
Ill. 1998)).
92
Id. (citing Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels., Inc., 2008 WL 2951281, at *5
(N.D. Cal. 2008)).
93
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
94
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Elvis Presley
Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 2003)).
95
See id. (reasoning that the band Green Day’s use of a drawing was only incidentally
commercial, which weighs in favor of a finding of fair use) (citing Elvis Presley Enters.,
Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 2003)).
96
Golosker, supra note 64, at 393-94 (recognizing that although the music of Greg
Gillis—the man behind sampling and mash-up artist Girl Talk—was not commercially
released, the music is still considered commercial because Gillis made enough money from
the music in other avenues to quit his day job as a biomedical engineer).
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commerciality is not “whether the sole motive of the use is monetary
gain[,] but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material” without first obtaining a license.97
In Chapman, this is a vital point in the court’s consideration of the first
factor. In analyzing the first factor, the court applied the Ninth Circuit’s
two-step analysis, which asks “whether the use of the work is commercial
in nature” and “whether such use is transformative.”98 The initial purpose
of the Minaj’s use of Chapman’s composition was to experiment with it,
and Minaj “never intended to exploit the work without a license,” thus the
use of Chapman’s work was not purely commercial.99 Although it was her
intention to commercially exploit the song if given permission, the weight
of commercialism is lessened because she excluded the song from her
album upon being denied a license.100 Because Minaj was simply
experimenting with the song in the studio, the commercial purpose of the
use was merely incidental.101 Despite the incidentally commercial nature
of the use—in that she intended to use the song for her album if she had
obtained permission—the “low degree of [actual] exploitation here
counterbalances that” because Minaj ultimately excluded the song from
her album.102
The purpose of the use of Chapman’s song was not only to experiment
with the work, but also to “create a form that can be submitted to the rights
holder for approval.”103 As the court discusses, artists typically experiment
with copyrighted works before seeking a license from the copyright
holder, as copyright holders usually ask to listen to the proposed work
before granting permission to use their work.104 Even Chapman herself has
asked to see samples of proposed works by other artists before approving
licensing requests to see how her work was used, thus arguing “against the
very practice she maintains.”105
Even if a use is commercial in nature or purpose, courts often consider
the public benefit—whether or not it is direct or tangible—of a challenged

97

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
Chapman v. Maraj, No. 2:18-cv-09088, 10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020) (citing Furie v.
Infowars, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 952, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2019)).
99
Id. at 10.
100
Id. (citations omitted).
101
Id.
102
Id. (citing Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the commercial motivation to receive royalties with or without permission is
outweighed by the fact that the paper was not published when permission was not granted).
103
Id. at 10.
104
Id.
105
Id.
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use.106 The court in Chapman discussed the public benefit in allowing
artists to experiment with copyrighted work before seeking a license.107 In
fact, it is common practice for artists to work on projects incorporating
copyrighted works before ever requesting a license to use the copyrighted
work.108 As the court points out, “[a] ruling uprooting these common
practices would limit creativity and stifle innovation in the music
industry,” which opposes copyright law’s goal “of promoting the arts for
the public good.”109 Therefore, the court found that the purpose and
character of Minaj’s work favored a finding of fair use.110

ii. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
When considering the nature of the work, courts must “recognize that
some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
others.”111 Works that are creative in nature fall into this category, which
results in this factor weighing against a finding of fair use, as it is more
difficult to establish that the use or copying of creative works is fair.112
Because music is a creative work, it is at the heart of copyright protection.
Thus, this factor weighs against a finding of fair use in cases involving the
use of copyrighted musical compositions or sound recordings.113 The
nature of the work must also be considered in conjunction with the first
factor because where the purpose of the use is more beneficial to the
public, the second factor can be weighed more lightly, thus being less
determinative.114
The court in Chapman briefly discussed the nature of the copyrighted
work. Chapman’s musical composition belongs in the category of music,
which is “at the core of copyright’s protective purpose” because it is
creative in nature.115 Therefore, the Chapman court determined that the
second factor weighed against a finding of fair use.116

106

See id. (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir.
1992)).
107
Id.
108
See id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., id.
114
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 4:1 (2021).
115
Chapman, 2020 WL 6260021, at 11 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 586 (1994)).
116
Id.
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iii. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor requires courts to consider “the quantity and value of
the materials used.”117 Fair use is less likely to be found where a new work
uses a significant portion of the copyrighted work, while fair use is more
likely in scenarios where only a small part of copyrighted material is
utilized.118
This inquiry, like those of the other fair use factors, must be considered
along with other factors, as it is a matter of degree.119 For example, where
a use is highly transformative, courts typically allow a greater quantity of
the work to be considered fair.120 This is because a transformative use is
more likely to advance the progress of the arts, which is central to the
purpose of copyright law.121 Thus, “the determination of the amount and
substantiality of the portions used depends greatly on the specific . . .
samples used.”122 If the material used refrains from taking the “heart” of
the copyrighted work, a finding of fair use is much more likely, as well.123
The commerciality analyzed in the first factor may also be considered
when determining whether the amount and substantiality of the
copyrighted work used weighs against or in favor of a finding of fair use
because “a commercial use exploits the original artist, thereby diminishing
the incentive of the original artist to create art.”124 If a use is
noncommercial or private, using almost the entire work may be considered
fair, while the use of a much smaller portion of a copyrighted work may
not be considered fair if the use is commercial in nature.125
In the Chapman court’s analysis of the third factor, it noted that
Minaj’s work incorporated most of the lyrics and portions of the vocal
melodies from Chapman’s musical composition.126 Typically, this would
weigh heavily against a finding of fair use, however, this factor, as
mentioned previously, should be analyzed in conjunction with the other
factors, particularly the purpose of the use.127 The court argued that the
117

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
See id.
119
See Warner Bros. Ent. Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 546-49 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (holding that the amount and substantiality of the portion copied from Harry Potter
companion books “weighs more heavily against a finding of fair use” because the purpose
of the new work was only slightly transformative of the companion books’ purpose).
120
Pote, supra note 18, at 679 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
587-88 (1994)).
121
Id. at 681.
122
Id. at 680.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 681.
125
Id.
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Chapman v. Maraj, No. 2:18-cv-09088, 11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020).
127
Pote, supra note 18, at 681.
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amount that Minaj used “was no more than that necessary to show
Chapman how [she] intended to use the [c]omposition in the new work.”128
Therefore, the amount used actually favored a finding of fair use in this
case.129

iv. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market or Value
of the Copyrighted Work
Lastly, courts must consider “whether, and to what extent, the
unlicensed use harms the existing or future market for the copyright
owner’s original work. In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, Justice
O’Connor argued that the last factor of fair use is “undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use.”130 Evaluating the effect on the market
is rooted in the purpose of copyright law: to incentivize artists in order to
promote the progress of the arts.131 Copyright holders are likely to be
discouraged from creating new works when they are unable to fully exploit
their existing copyrighted works due to market harm from infringing
uses.132
In assessing this factor, courts consider “the extent of market harm
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer” as well as
“‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by
the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market’ for the original.”133 Thus, the inquiry turns on whether
the new work acts as a substitute for the original copyrighted work in the
original’s market.134 Courts analyzing the fourth factor, therefore, are
concerned primarily with economic injury to the copyright holder.135
Because sampling or replaying copyrighted work in new music creates a
derivate work of the original song, artists are likely to lose licensing
revenue if that new work is commercially exploited without a license from
the original artist.136 Even though new works that sample or replay the
original may not directly harm the market of the original work, at a
minimum, “the likelihood of harm for lost licensing revenues exists.”137
128

Chapman, 2020 WL 6260021, at 11.
Id.
130
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
131
Pote, supra note 18, at 681.
132
Id.
133
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting Nimmer
§ 13.05[A] [4], 13-102.61).
134
Pote, supra note 18, at 681 (citing Castle Rock Entm’t., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group,
Inc. 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Campbell,
510 U.S. at 591).
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Pote, supra note 18, at 682.
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Judge Pierre Leval, in reviewing the fair use opinions in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios and Harper & Row, said, “In short, the market
effect by itself is nearly meaningless. We cannot interpret it without
learning from other factors.”138 Typically, courts analyze the first and
fourth factors together, noting that market effect should be considered in
light of whether the purpose or character of the use is commercial.139 The
analysis in Sony affirms this idea, asserting that the importance of
demonstrating a likelihood of significant market harm is greater when a
use is noncommercial, whereas a likelihood of harm is sometimes
presumed if the use is intended for commercial gain.140 Nevertheless, the
fact that a use presents no possible harm to the market does not necessarily
mean that the use is fair, as no single factor is determinative of the result
of a fair use analysis.141 In the realm of sampling and replaying, the more
a new work transforms the original, is used noncommercially, and only
takes smaller or less significant portions of the original, the more likely
the market will not be harmed by the use, thus constituting a fair use.142
In Chapman v. Maraj, the court analyzed the potential harm that
Minaj’s use has on the market for Chapman’s musical composition. It
noted that “there is no evidence that the new work usurps any potential
market for Chapman.”143 Chapman argued that because Minaj used her
work with the intention to commercially gain from it, there should have
been a presumption of market harm.144 The commercial purpose of
Minaj’s use, however, was only incidental, and she did not attempt to
exploit the work without Chapman’s permission.145 The court concluded
that because “the creation of the work for private experimentation and to
secure a license from the license holder has no impact on the commercial
market for the original work,” the fourth factor weighed in favor of a
finding of fair use.146

v. Other Considerations and Weighing the Factors
Due to the indeterminate and discretionary nature of the fair use
doctrine, courts are free to consider other relevant factors in determining
138

Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1460
(1997).
139
National Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 561
(6th Cir. 1994).
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Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
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Pote, supra note 18, at 682.
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whether a use is fair.147 For example, courts may contemplate how a
request for permission from the copyright owner affects whether or not the
use of the copyrighted work is fair. A request for permission from the
copyright owner to use a work can indicate bad faith if the copyright owner
refuses to grant a license but the person requesting uses the copyrighted
work anyway.148 However, requests for permission should not necessarily
be weighed against a finding of fair use, as the request for a license can
simply indicate an effort to avoid litigation, even if the use is a fair one.149
Although the Sixth Circuit created a bright-line rule in Bridgeport Music,
Inc. v. Dimension Films that sampling copyrighted music requires a
license, courts are not precluded from finding fair use in cases where the
copyright holder does not grant permission.150
Regardless of whether a court decides to stick with the four primary
factors or consult additional ones, the case-by-case character of the fair
use doctrine requires that the inquiry analyze all factors together and in
light of the purposes of copyright law.151 In doing so, courts must attempt
to maintain the “constitutional balance between sufficient incentives to
authors and reasonable, unconsented-to and uncompensated uses by the
public.”152 Thus, the four statutory factors should not be looked at
individually as if mechanically referencing a checklist.153 Judge Leval
emphasizes this idea, noting that the factors “do not represent a score card
that promises victory to the winner of the majority.”154 A comprehensive
analysis weighing each of the factors together keeps with the case-by-case
nature of the fair use doctrine, as the specific circumstances of every case
will alter the way in which a court will take the factors into consideration
to determine whether or not a particular use is fair and thus non-infringing.
In weighing each of the four factors, the court in Chapman found that
Minaj was entitled to a finding of fair use because the purpose behind her
use of Chapman’s composition was “artistic experimentation and to seek
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454 (stating that the fair use doctrine is an “equitable rule of
reason” that should be applied in light of the purposes of copyright law).
148
See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 7:1 (2021).
149
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 at n. 18 (1994) (arguing
that although 2 Live Crew was denied permission to use a work, the denial of permission
should not weigh against a finding of fair use because if the use is fair, no permission is
required in the first place).
150
Golosker, supra note 64, at 388 (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,
410 F.3d 792, 799 (6th Cir. 2005)).
151
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
152
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 2:1 (2021).
153
See Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014)
(criticizing the district court’s mechanical approach to the fair use factors that improperly
gave equal weight to each of the four factors and then counted which ones favored and
disfavored a finding of fair use).
154
Leval, supra note 60, at 1110.
147
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license approval” from Chapman; she therefore could not be held liable
for infringing Chapman’s right to create derivative works from the musical
composition.155 Because Minaj used what was necessary in order to
request a license, her use was therefore only incidentally commercial and
thus did not impact the market for Chapman’s musical composition. 156
This holding has broad implications for the songwriting and sound
recording process, as well as innovation and experimentation in the music
industry under copyright law.

IV.

CHAPMAN’S IMPACT

The holding in Chapman has a number of implications for not only
music licensing but creativity and innovation in general. Section A
examines how Chapman interprets the fair use doctrine in a way that
balances the interests of artists who own copyrighted works and artists
who wish to build upon existing copyrighted work. The holding protects
copyright owner’s exclusive rights while allowing for some unauthorized
use of copyrighted work when that use is not for purposes of commercial
exploitation, or at least not initially. The ruling also not only helps
copyright law avoid an entirely infeasible regulation of pre-commercially
released sampling and replaying, but it also limits the burden imposed on
artists wishing to license copyrighted music they experiment with. Section
B analyzes the case’s impact more broadly as it relates to creativity and
innovation in music.

A.

The Functions of the Music Industry

The court in Chapman properly interpreted the fair use doctrine, and
its holding has important implications for the music industry. First, it
balances copyright owner’s interests in exploiting their works with the
interests of artists who wish to experiment with copyrighted work in the
creation of new ones. Second, it reduces the burden on creators in seeking
out licenses for the use of copyrighted work.

i. Balancing the Interests of New and Existing Artists
Experimentation with copyrighted works does not undermine
incentives for the creation of new works or unfairly deprive existing
copyright holders of revenue. As the court held in Chapman, Minaj’s
experimentation with Chapman’s musical composition had no impact on
the commercial market for Chapman’s work simply because Minaj may
155
156

Chapman v. Maraj, No. 2:18-cv-09088, 11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020).
Id. at 10-11.
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have intended to eventually release it commercially after obtaining a
license.157 Generally speaking, pre- and non-commercial uses of
copyrighted material, according to the court, pose no threat to the original
author’s ability to exploit their work in the market.158
Copyright law in the United States has treated private and personal
uses of copying as de facto non-infringing since before the 1970s.159 The
private experimentation with melodies and lyrics of copyrighted material
prior to commercial distribution should fall into this category. If the
purpose of the use of a copyrighted work is private or noncommercial, it
is much more likely that the use is a fair one.160 For example, the practice
of sampling or replaying existing copyrighted materials, no matter the
amount or substantiality of the use or even to what extent the new work
transforms the copyrighted one, probably constitutes fair use if the
individual does not distribute the new work commercially.161 Thus, anyone
is essentially free to sample or replay any song they wish to any degree,
“so long as the [work] is never distributed.”162 This practice should not be
altered simply because the person experimenting is a well-known
recording artist who has an incidental commercial purpose in using the
work.
Regulating the sampling and replaying of copyrighted materials for
noncommercial or incidentally commercial purposes, as discussed below,
is impractical. Avoiding the regulation of noncommercial use of
preexisting copyrighted work “serves the interests of both consumers and
creators.”163 A lack of regulation of pre- and non-commercial use of
copyrighted material will still continue to provide original authors with the
economic incentive to create new works while also encouraging new
artists to create meaningful access to preexisting works.164 Ultimately, this
balances both economic incentive and access to and use of works for the
public good and the development of the arts in society, which are each
fundamental to the goal of copyright law.165
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See id.
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Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use As Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 832
(2008).
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Id. at 687-88 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
468-70 (1984)).
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ii. Limiting the Burdens of the Music Licensing Process
The decision in Chapman is crucial to the existing music licensing
process, as well. Requiring a license for any and all experimentation with
a copyrighted work would be costly and quite burdensome. The existing
music licensing system is notoriously complicated and expensive.166
Licensing a song to use as a sample in new work “typically cost[s] between
$1,000 and $5,000.”167 And popular recording artists often demand
licensing costs that are “several times these amounts” because of the value
of their celebrity.168 Some copyright holders even require licensees to pay
additional “rollover rates” which vary depending on the success of the new
work, thereby increasing the cost of licensing.169 Also, some copyright
holders require that licensees give up a percentage of future profits from
the new work or even a percentage of copyright ownership in that work.170
Requiring individuals who wish to experiment with copyrighted material
to obtain a license for every song they may possibly use in a commercially
released work would also be extremely expensive.
Not only would this process pose a significant financial burden to
those wishing to sample or replay music, but it would present considerable
transaction costs, as well.171 Locating the copyright holder, negotiating a
license, and paying the negotiated price all take time and effort; and
“despite all these efforts, a copyright holder can arbitrarily refuse to
license [their] work.”172 The licensing process is “burdensome and
extremely expensive for professional artists,” but it is even more so for
amateur ones.173 Amateur artists would likely not pay the costs of
obtaining a license before working with it in the creation of a new one
because they may “have virtually no incentive to purchase the rights to a
166

See Aaron Power, 15 Megabytes of Fame: A Fair Use Defense for Mash-Ups as DJ
Culture Reaches Its Postmodern Limit, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 577, 586 (2007) (highlighting
the issues with implementing a bright-line rule requiring licenses for all instances of
sampling).
167
Brandes, supra note 29, at 123 (citing Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital
Sampling, Intermediate Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 217, 291 (1996)).
168
Id. (citing Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate
Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 217, 291 (1996)); Pote, supra note 18, at 685.
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Id. at 124.
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Id. (citing Music and Copyright 147 (Simon Frith and Lee Marshall eds., 2d ed. 2004);
Josh Norek, “You Can’t Sing Without the Bling”: The Toll of Excessive Sample License
Fees on Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the Need for a Compulsory Sound Recording
Sample License System, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004)).
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Harper, supra note 11, at 437 (citing Morrison, supra note 40, at 134).
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Id. (citing David Mongillo, The Girl Talk Dilemma: Can Copyright Law
Accommodate New Forms of Sample-Based Music?, U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Spring
2009, at 21; Pote, supra note 18, at 646.
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Harper, supra note 11, at 437-38 (citing Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices
for User-Generated Content, J. INTERNET L. 1, 8, 17 (2009)).
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song that will not bear any financial fruits.”174 On the other hand, those
who experiment with preexisting music, even if only for the purpose of
pure enjoyment rather than for ultimate sale or distribution, might actually
be willing to pay the cost of obtaining a license for the same reason that
amateurs with no intention of trying to “make it” in the music industry
invest in musical instruments or music editing software, for example. That
being said, those who work with a significant amount of copyrighted
material, whether for fun or for a commercial purpose, probably would not
find it worthwhile to negotiate and pay for a license for every single song
they experiment with knowing that they may only use a very small
percentage of that music in new works they actually end up distributing.
Seeking permission for replaying an existing copyrighted work
already gives the experimenter the burden of finding the copyright owner
or owners of the musical composition, which can prove to be quite
difficult, particularly if the copyrighted song in question does not have
easily accessible copyright ownership information online. Finding
ownership information for purposes of sampling is even more difficult
because there are two distinct copyrights involved in sampling, forcing
potential licensees to “locate and purchase clearances from both the sound
recording and musical composition copyright holders.”175 Not only is it
costly just to pay for the license itself, but keeping track of all potential
samples and replays and negotiating licensing fees presents further
transactional costs.176 Together, the price of obtaining a license to
experiment with a copyrighted work for the purpose of sampling or
replaying it in a new work would be far too burdensome for many artists,
songwriters, and producers.
Even aside from the burden on artists wishing to sample or replay
copyrighted music, regulating the use of copyrighted material in the studio
before commercial release would be nearly impossible. Attempting to
track down individuals who sample or replay copyrighted material and
distribute it “is expensive and often unsuccessful.”177 Thus, regulating the
experimentation with copyrighted music for the purpose of sampling or
replaying presents the same challenges that scholars have identified
174

Id. at 438 (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 n.15
(6th Cir. 2005); Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices for User-Generated
Content, J. INTERNET L. 1, 8, 14, 17 (2009) (arguing that licensing costs for noncommercial
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Marshal eds., 2d ed. 2004)).
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Id. (citing Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate
Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 217, 291 (1996)).
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Chused, supra note 13, at 183 (arguing that attempting to suppress digital copying,
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regarding the regulation of mashups and remixes that use copyrighted
material: “Given the fact that anyone with a computer and the requisite
software can create his very own mashup, regulating the creation of
mashups seems like an insurmountable challenge.”178 One of the only
instances in which a requirement to license samples or replays for
experimentation could be adequately enforced would be those similar to
the circumstances in Chapman in which a copyright holder only knows
about a use because an artist, in good faith, requested a license to use it.
And these situations, one could argue, are the least of concern regarding
an imposition on copyright holders’ exclusive rights, as the copyright
holder has the power to deny a license and has been put on notice in the
event that the potential licensee moves forward with releasing sampled or
replayed music without a license.
If experimenting with copyrighted music—whether for pre- or noncommercial use—did not constitute fair use, the sheer scale of activity is
“so enormous that it is unstoppable.”179 Because artists’ level of access to
copyrighted music is so great and the “widespread cultural sensibility that
we all have the right to freely use significant amounts of copyrighted
work . . . and cleverly manipulate copyrighted materials,” it does not seem
practical to attempt to “cabin the extent to which creative people [feel] free
to use copyrighted materials in their work,” particularly if those uses do
not lead to a commercially released work that could actually harm the
market for the original copyrighted song.180
Giving copyright holders of musical works the ability to deny
permission to experiment with their work is contrary to the goals of
copyright law, as it would do little to actually prevent the distribution of
unlicensed derivative works and has no impact on the copyright holder’s
own exploitation of the work.181 A copyright owner’s loss of control of
their work when artists experiment with it should not be a concern when
the standard practice in the music industry is to seek permission before
commercially releasing a new work that incorporates preexisting
copyrighted work. Although licensing—and thus obtaining permission
from a copyright owner to use a copyrighted work in a commercially
released new derivative work—is a functioning part of the music industry,
the practice should be limited to instances where an artist’s sampled work
is ready to be commercially exploited or distributed in a way that no longer
constitutes fair use.182 It is only appropriate to force artists to comply with
178

Harper, supra note 11, at 438.
See Chused, supra note 13, at 181.
180
Id. at 180.
181
See id. at 203.
182
Some argue that the way in which music licensing functions today—requiring a
license for basically any borrowing or copying for commercial use—is a direct result of
179

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

263

the considerable burdens of the music licensing process once they have
experimented with copyrighted material to the extent that they are ready
to seek a license for permission to commercially release the new work.
When a copyright holder’s exclusive rights are “used more as a weapon
than as a tool of innovation,” copyright law is not doing its job.183

B.

Fair Use, Creativity, and Innovation

It is “universally agreed” that the promotion of creativity is at the core
of copyright law’s purpose.184 The enforcement of copyright law,
therefore, must seek to encourage creativity rather than stifle it. The fair
use doctrine, which has been applied to a wide variety of situations since
its inception, is necessary to the copyright regime’s purpose of
encouraging innovation and creativity.185 It is especially vital in
“balancing the rights of current artists and the rights of future artists” so
that when a use “facilitate[s] the progress of the arts,” a future artist can
reference, employ, and develop the works of previous ones.186
The fair use limitation plays a fundamental role in the development of
creativity and innovation in the music industry. If an infringing use is not
harmful to an artist and it functions to enable the progression of the arts in
some way, it should be considered fair.187 Use of copyrighted works for
the purpose of experimentation with the intent to obtain a license, as
Chapman indicates, does just that.188
If the fair use doctrine had not been interpreted the way it was by the
court in Chapman, copyright law would, to a great extent, “inhibit the
creation of works of art and the advancement of art at all” which is
“directly contrary to the fundamental purpose of copyright law.”189 In fact,
the “concept of stifling creativity” came from early courts’ rationale for
using the fair use defense “to allow certain creative uses of works which
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copyright law did not technically permit.”190 Thus, the idea that there are
some infringements of copyright law that should be allowed because they
encourage innovation and foster creativity is central to the notion of fair
use. As many proponents of a flexible fair use standard argue, copyright
law “should demonstrate flexibility and adaptation” to innovation, and a
fair use interpretation that limits the ability to innovate “contradict[s] the
purpose of copyright law: a stifling of music, culture, and creativity.”191
Creative works are “important components of collective cultural
landscapes,” and those who wish to contribute to the progression of culture
“must engage with what is already there.”192 Referencing, building upon,
and using copyrighted works is quite prevalent in the music industry, and,
“in order for art to advance, artists must be able to build off of previous
works, to some extent.”193 And, “[t]he pervasive nature of borrowing in
music suggests that more careful consideration needs to be given to the
extent to which copying and borrowing have been, and can be, a source of
innovation within music.”194 If experimentation were policed to the extent
suggested by Chapman in this case, artists would be discouraged from
referencing preexisting copyrighted material which, in turn, would stifle
the progress of creativity and the development of the arts. Many have
argued that “overly rigid control of access to and manipulation of cultural
goods stifles artistic and cultural innovation,” creating what some have
deemed a “permission culture.”195 And in such a world, “[t]he opportunity
to create and transform becomes weakened.”196 Thus, permission should
only be required when an artist’s use of copyrighted material impedes a
copyright holder’s ability to exploit the work being used. The fair use
limitation is, therefore, an important mechanism in balancing the interests
of artists in using preexisting work when the use contributes to the
advancement of the arts with the interests of the work’s copyright holder
in receiving the appropriate reward for the creation of their work in the
market.197
If the Chapman court had held differently—that Minaj’s use of
Chapman’s composition was not fair and thus infringing—
experimentation and innovation in the music industry would be severely
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thwarted. Notably, the holding would have essentially suggested that
anyone sampling or replaying songs at home for noncommercial purposes
could be liable for copyright infringement.198 Such a holding would not
have furthered the goals of copyright. In fact, it would have gone far
beyond the purpose of copyright law, unnecessarily tipping the delicate
balance in favor of the interests of copyright owners and against the
general public in accessing new music and promoting innovation in the
industry. Instead of providing copyright holders with the appropriate level
of exclusive right over the use of their works, the copyright regime for
which Chapman argued would give copyright holders absolute and
unequivocal control over the use of their work, even in instances when the
use does utterly no harm to the copyright holder.
The purpose of the fair use exception is “to protect existing work from
misappropriation while not hindering the introduction of new works to the
public.”199 Derivative works that are not yet commercially accessible and
are merely created with the intention of obtaining permission from the
original copyright owner do not threaten the market for the original work,
thus they do not infringe upon the original copyright owner’s exclusive
rights. Prohibiting experimentation with existing copyrighted material
would considerably hinder the introduction of new works to the public, as
artists would be discouraged from performing any referential activity in
the creation of new music for fear of legal repercussions. Preventing artists
from fully engaging in the creative process threatens the progress of
science200—the cornerstone of copyright law, as stated in the
Constitution.201
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CONCLUSION

The Central District of California’s interpretation of the fair use
doctrine and thus its holding in Chapman v. Maraj concretely allows
artists to experiment with preexisting copyrighted material without
permission before seeking a license, even if the artist’s purpose in doing
so is incidentally commercial. If the court had determined that Nicki
Minaj’s use of Tracy Chapman’s musical composition did not constitute
fair use of Chapman’s copyrighted work, artists would be discouraged
from building off of existing music due to the high financial and
transactional costs of licensing any potential sample and for fear of the
legal consequence, which severely stifles creativity and innovation in the
music industry. The fair use doctrine—an essential limitation to a
copyright holder’s exclusive control over the use of their works—helps
support the goals of copyright law in contributing to the progress of music.
Although Nicki Minaj did experiment with the “Sorry” cover of Tracy
Chapman’s song, recorded a derivative work, and repeatedly sought
Chapman’s permission to include it on her album, her use was a fair one.
She never released it, so she is certainly not “Sorry.”

